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WHY COPPERWELD WAS ACTUALLY KIND OF DUMB: SOUND,
FURY AND THE ONCE AND STILL MISSING
ANTITRUST THEORY OF THE FIRM
CHRIS SAGERS*
Simple ideas hardly ever are very productive if the
underlying reality is complex.'
It was an uncommon pleasure to speak at the symposium of
which this paper was a part, and not only because of Villanova's
exceptional new law school facility, the warm welcome provided by
the journal's staffers, or the caliber of the panelists.2 It was an op-
portunity to seriously re-think something that had seemed obvious.
In the years since Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,3 it had
come to seem that antitrust really needs a "theory of the firm." Cop-
perweld seemed pretty plainly to direct the lower courts to develop
some theory of the firm, and their efforts had been disappointing.4
So I thought someone should figure out some such theory that
* Chris Sagers is Professor of Law at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. My thanks to the panelists and participants at the sym-
posium, and particularly to Meir Feder for conversations before and after. Thanks
also for fruitftl exchanges on Copperweld and single-entity issues with Peter Carsten-
sen, Anant Raut, Barak Richman, and Maurice Stucke. Comments are welcome at
csagers@law.csuohio.edu.
1. Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating "Deregulation" of Commercial Air Travel: False
Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 109, 150 (1989).
2. The panel included some truly major talent, among whom I felt pretty out
of place. It included a major league team owner, one of the country's most promi-
nent defenders of the "single entity" treatment of pro sports, not just one but two
counsel who took part in litigation of American Needle before the Supreme Court,
and a prominent federal enforcement official. The discussion was, as one might
guess, good. Also, myself an advisor to a student law journal, I can't overstate the
good it did me that this journal's members were so engaged in the event and, by all
appearances, they all attended the entire thing.
3. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
4. Copperweld addressed the question whether a corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary could constitute a "contract, combination,. . . or conspiracy" that
could be subject to section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court said no,
explaining that where two entities share the same economic interest they are not
"separate" enough to satisfy section 1's multiplicity requirement. In the course of
explaining that, the Court seemed to indicate that there could be other relation-
ships that rendered defendants only one "single entity" under the Sherman Act,
even though there might not be a 100% ownership at stake. The problem since
then has been that lower courts' "single entity" determinations have been ad hoc
and theoretically hollow. Outcomes are unpredictable and it is often unclear just
which policies are thought to be served. See infra Part II.B.
(377)
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would coherently serve the purposes of antitrust and produce pre-
dictable outcomes. I had said so5 and others had said it as well.6
That now seems incorrect, and Copperweld seems more regretta-
ble than ever. In fact, the proceedings of this conference, and the
fact that the contours of a "single entity" remains a matter of such
controversy, came to seem emblematic of the deep misdirection of
contemporary antitrust. They suggested just how far antitrust has
forgotten that it is a law, a practical system for real-world applica-
tion of public policy choices made through our system of govern-
ment. Much too much of the time it seems to fancy itself an
abstract policy seminar to be dabbled in for its own sake, by the
federal judiciary and its academic support staff. In fact, so far as I
am aware, one simple question appears to have gone basically
unasked throughout several decades of single-entity debate: Does
antitrust need some elaborate sociological inquiry, of the kind ap-
parently envisioned by Copperweld, at the very beginning of a lawsuit?
I think not. If there is one thing antitrust does not need, it is
yet another rule for summary dismissal at the early stages of litiga-
tion. There are at least a few dozen such rules already.7 The chief
5. See Chris Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving Antitrust Theory
of the Firm: What Will Become of Section 1?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2009, available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/08/Aug9-Sagers8-1 2f.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM.
L. REv. 497 (1992).
7. By most accounts, Sherman Act section 1 claims have gotten much easier to
dismiss, under Bell AtL Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007). Likewise, in all anti-
trust cases private plaintiffs must make what have come to be difficult demonstra-
tions of antitrust "injury" and antitrust "standing." SeeJoseph P. Bauer, The Stealth
Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing,
62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 437, 441-51 (2001). Additionally indirect-purchase plaintiffs
can never sue in federal antitrust, under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977). Furthermore, wherever a plaintiff challenges a defendant that is regulated
under some law other than antitrust, there is the chance that defendant has an
"implied repeal" defense, and that defense appears to have become substantially
more powerful since the Credit Suisse ruling of 2007. It now appears that antitrust
can be "repealed" where compliance with both antitrust and the other regulatory
scheme would be merely costly or even only speculative-that is, it could be re-
pealed even when the conduct is illegal under both laws, so long as the regulatory
treatment of that conduct could conceivably change in the future. See Credit
Suisse Secs. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275-84 (2007). Even where im-
plied repeal is unavailable, private plaintiffs might also be unable to recover dam-
ages for rates that are "filed" with a regulatory agency, perhaps even where the
agency in question provides no substantive review of the rates. See Goldwasser v.
Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara
Frontier Tariff Bur., Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417 n.19 (1986)). And indeed, perhaps
where the rates are not even filed. See In re Hawaiian & Guamanian Cabotage
Antitr. Litig., 2010 WL 4996730, at *9-11 (W.D. Wash. 2010). No one can chal-
lenge the trade-restraining conduct of state governments, see Hoover v. Ronwin,
466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984), even where it may constitute private action that is
merely authorized and supervised by a state government, see Cal. Ret. Liq. Dealers
[Vol. 18: p. 377
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justification for most of these rules is the protection of legitimate
enterprises from frivolous litigation. But at least in the case of the
single entity rule, that fear is surely overstated, in light of the ease
with which truly single entities could get early dismissal on the mer-
its and the unlikelihood that many plaintiffs would bother with
such obviously hopeless lawsuits.8 That point was made to the
Court but ignored in Copperweld, and it has largely failed in other
courts as well.9 Most of these rules for quick disposal, including the
single-entity inquiry, as American Needle itself demonstrated, can be
applied with little or no discovery. In that sense, they are just one
more symptom of what antitrust has become. Ever more, the com-
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). Nor can anyone chal-
lenge private conduct that can be characterized as part of a "petition" to govern-
ment for redress of grievances, see E. R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961), or as part of labor negotiations, see Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-42 (1996) (generally describing the so-called "labor exemp-
tion"). And, for no plausible reason on earth, no one can sue baseball. See Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Finally, there also remain upwards of thirty statutory
exemptions from antitrust for various industries and activities. See SECrION OF ANTI-
TRUST L., Am. BAR Ass'N, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAw
(2007) (listing all statutory exemptions still in force).
8. For example, during the panel discussion, one participant proposed a hy-
pothetical in which a professional sports league changed its scheduling rules to
reduce the number of games in its regular season. He then suggested that such
action was an example of naked, horizontal output restriction. And, the point was
that exposure to antitrust laws under such circumstances would produce absurd
results, subjecting mundane matters such as the scheduling of games to judicial
scrutiny.
This alleged result, however, is almost certainly incorrect. Scheduling
changes are no more naked than a product design standard produced by a private
standard setting organization. The standard is a horizontal agreement not to pro-
duce competing designs if the organization includes competing manufacturers of
the product. If the standard came to have influence because the product displays
a strong need for interoperability, this horizontal output restriction might have
significant trade restraining consequences. It is unlikely, however, to be held per se
illegal because this activity is ancillary to the pro-competitive purpose of quality
improvement and technological innovation. See generally Sean P. Gates, Standards,
Innovation, and Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collabora-
tive Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583 (1998) (discussing case law treatment of
private standard setting).
Most plaintiffs do not bother to challenge arrangements so plainly subject to
the full rule of reason-like garden variety standard setting and sports league
scheduling rules-because rule of reason analysis presents them with almost cer-
tain loss.
9. The point was made in justice Stevens's excellent dissent, which was joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, but it was ignored by the majority. See Cop-
perweld, 467 U.S. at 778-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They argued that intra-corpo-
rate conspiracy cases should be handled by the rule of reason, under which most
cases would be quickly dismissed for the same reasons of pro-competitive efficiency
that drove the Coppenveld majority opinion. See id. at 778-79. The majority no-
where directly addressed this argument, stressing only its view of the congressional
intent. Cf id. at 775-76.
379
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petition policy that governs all of our nation's markets is a scholas-
tic, metaphysical game of strictly a priori theoretical reasoning,
often performed on the basis of little evidence by trial judges as
they sit alone in their chambers.
While that ultimately is the point to be made, this brief essay
will make only one small part of it. As proof that resolving matters
like the metaphysical boundaries of real-world institutions with glib,
a priori rules was maybe not such a good idea, this essay will explore
the lower court caselaw concerning single entity treatment, both as
it existed before and after Coppeneld.10 Coppenveld was widely seen
as a watershed, and its wisdom is now essentially unquestioned. So
one might have thought there would be quite a change in the lower
courts' handling of these issues. With Copperweld's more elaborate,
economically enlightened guidance, their decisions should have be-
come more predictable and more coherently linked to clear policy
goals. If nothing else, they should at least seem different. And yet,
they do not. They seem quite the same. Both before and after Cop-
peweld they seem ad hoc, subjective, and largely unexplained. In
other words, as has been said before, courts have been "bemused by
the label 'joint venture"' for decades,' even though they have been
told not to be. 12 They have struggled for many years to find expla-
nations in their collaboration cases that are coherent and relevant
to the goals of antitrust, but mostly they boil down to just their
hunches about how well defendant collaborators seem "integrated"
or "economically unified." As Adolph Berle said in a similar con-
text, the courts in these cases have been using words rather than
rules.' 3 And so, while measuring the effects of economic integra-
tion may very well be the "central issue confronting antitrust pol-
icy," it is also one as to which "[t]here is . . . no easy way to
distinguish desirable from undesirable transactions."' 4 For that rea-
10. Before Copperweld, the lower courts were obliged to try to decide when a
parent and subsidiary-even a wholly owned one-were "separate" enough to con-
spire. After Copperweld, they must still decide when corporate affiliates that are not
parent and wholly owned subsidiary are nevertheless so unified that they cannot
conspire.
11. Robert Pitofsky, joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on
the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HRv. L. REv. 1007, 1045-46 (1969).
12. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951)
("agreements ... to suppress competition . . . can [not] be justified by labeling the
project a 'joint venture.' Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain
trade could be so labeled.").
13. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The Theory ofEnterprise Entity, 47 COLUMBiA L. REv.
343, 346 (1947).
14. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1523,
1523 (1982).
[Vol. 18: p. 377
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son this essay urges that the courts just stop trying to squeeze it into
a glib rule for summary disposal.
I. THE SINGLE ENrnY PROBLEM
The courts have held since early in antitrust history that "uni-
lateral" conduct is exempt from section 1, as the words "contract,"
"combination," and "conspiracy" each seems to imply that there be
more than one "person" involved. 5 Strictly speaking, the language
of section 1 does not require this result, as even the Copperweld ma-
jority recognized.' 6 Among other things, section 1 contemplates
not just "contracts" and "conspiracies," but also "combinations,"
and it was designed to reach those tightly affiliated corporate fami-
lies known as "trusts" for which antitrust law is named.' 7 In fact the
Court itself in early opinions treated sections 1 and 2 as largely in-
terchangeable, and no less than Oliver Wendell Holmes once said
so explicitly.' 8 It also seems unlikely that the Congress of 1890 un-
derstood a sharp distinction between conspiracy within and without
corporate affiliations.19 Copperweld's sharp distinction between sec-
tion 1 and section 2 conduct-and the gap left open between
them-was therefore a departure from prior law, though one that
had been developing for a long time. That rather puts the lie to
15. The first clear Supreme Court authority to this effect was United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which held that a manufacturer's unilateral
refusal to sell its product to a buyer, no matter what the purpose or consequence,
could not violate section 1. Lower courts had reached the same result somewhat
earlier. See Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909).
16. Copperweld found that some concept of the boundaries of "firms" is
needed, but only for policy reasons. As the Court wrote: Nothing in the literal
meaning of th[e] terms excludes coordinated conduct among officers or employ-
ees of the same company. But it is perfectly plain that an internal "agreement" to
implement a single, unitary firm's policies does not raise the antitrust dangers that
section 1 was designed to police. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769.
17. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (making these
points).
18. See Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 404 (1904) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
All that is added to the 1st section by § 2 is that like penalties are imposed
upon every single person who, without combination, monopolizes.. . . It
is more important as an aid to the construction of § 1 than it is on its own
account. It shows that whatever is criminal when done by way of combina-
tion is equally criminal if done by a single man.
Id.
19. AsJustice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Copperweld, the law of crimi-
nal conspiracy as it existed in 1890 recognized that affiliated corporations could
conspire and that corporate agents could conspire with one another or with their
corporations. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 785-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (Justice
Stevens's citations are all to post-1890 cases, but there is plenty of authority to the
same effect predating 1890.)
381
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one of the most fundamental claims on which Copperweld was based:
that Congress itself intended to draw a substantively important dis-
tinction between concerted action under section 1 and unilateral
action under section 2. (The Copperweld majority claimed that the
1890 Congress perceived concerted action to be much more dan-
gerous, and so made it more easily penalized, and therefore also
required clear proof of true multilateral conduct.) It seems likely
that Congress intended nothing of the sort.
But, though that may be, it is now deeply engrained that sec-
tion 1 liability requires conspiracy among two or more persons who
are legally "separate" from one another. Thus, it has been long set-
tled that a firm's officers and employees cannot conspire with one
another, and the firm cannot conspire with them either,20 unless
those agents act on their own behalves.21 Likewise, apparently only
one judicial opinion has ever found a conspiracy among a firm's
unincorporated divisions,22 a decision made under unusual circum-
stances2 3 and later reversed.2 4
One problem, though, posed the courts quite a bit more
trouble, and it was this problem that finally came to a head in Cop-
penveld. For some decades prior to the 1980s, the Supreme Court
20. Strictly speaking, one Sixth Circuit opinion from 1915 held that corporate
officers could conspire. See Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 618 (6th Cir.
1915). Critics have observed that there was a sufficient basis in that case for sec-
tion 2 liability, which the court also affirmed, and in any event Patterson's section 1
rule was never followed in subsequent caselaw. See Donald G. Kempf, Jr., Bathtub
Conspiracies: Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. LA.w. 173, 173-74
(1968).
21. See Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 760 F.2d 466, 469-70
(8th Cir. 1985) (antitrust can apply to action between corporation and its agent
where agent acts on its own behalf); Greenville Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflector,
Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1974) (same).
22. See Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F.
Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967). Critics observed at the time that only Hawaiian Oke
had ever reached this result. See Kempf, supra note 20, at 173; Everett I. Willis &
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 20, 20 n.1 (1968). Further research has uncovered no other examples.
23. DefendantJoseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. was accused of conspiring with
several of its unincorporated divisions. It previously managed those divisions as
wholly owned subsidiaries, and apparently merged them into itself only because
the Supreme Court had previously found the company capable of conspiring with
them in their separately incorporated form. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). While the Hawaiian Oke court stated
the then-existing law of intra-enterprise conspiracy in quite broad terms, the court
supported its decision by observing Seagram's effort to evade the effect of Kiefer-
Stewart, finding that "[a]lthough Seagram changed the form of its corporate struc-
ture following Kiefer-Stewart, there was no substantive change in the marketing
technique employed." 272 F. Supp. at 920-21.
24. SeeJoseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
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flirted with the idea that the separately incorporated members of a
corporate family could conspire with one another. While it had
some earlier antecedents in the lower courts and arguably in some
earlier Supreme Court opinions,25 this flirtation was dominated by
the thinking of Hugo Black. It was premised predominantly on
three opinions he wrote over about twenty years,26 and also on a
much disputed citation by him to United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 27 In
keeping with his fondness for bright-line doctrinal rigidity, Justice
Black in these opinions simply said with no elaboration that the
defendants' legal form is in itself irrelevant to section 1 liability.
Thus was born a much-maligned doctrine that came to be known as
the "intra-enterprise conspiracy" rule.
A familiar string-cite of pre-Copperweld articles were harshly crit-
ical of this rule28 and the enforcement agencies cast doubt on it as
well.2 9 Critics were especially bothered by the risk that there could
25. The most important of these opinions was United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (1941), which was apparently the first decision to find conspir-
acy between a parent and wholly owned subsidiary. See also United States v. New
York Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
26. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co.,
340 U.S. at 211.
27. 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 215 (citing Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. at 218). As the Court would later point out in Copperweld, there is
some doubt whether any Supreme Court opinion before Kiefer-Stewart, including
Yellow Cab, had squarely adopted the intra-enterprise conspiracy rule. But in Kiefer-
Stewart, Justice Black merely wrote that to find corporate affiliates incapable of
conspiracy would "run [ ] counter to our past decisions that common ownership
and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws,"
and for that he cited only Yellow Cab with no elaboration. See Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984).
28. See, e.g., M.A. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv. 27,
50-53 (1949); Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV.
451 (1983); Milton Handler & Thomas A. Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorpo-
rate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDozo L. REV. 23 (1981); Kempf, supra note 20; Law-
rence C. McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183 (1955); James A. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44
ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950); George W. Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5 (1963); Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 22; Ann I.
Jones, Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Approach, 71
CAL. L. REv. 1732 (1983); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977).
29. Notably in a frequently cited 1955 report of a study commission ap-
pointed by President Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert Brownwell. The re-
port is remembered especially for the breadth of representation among its
commissioners-they comprised sixty economists and lawyers of a broad range of
political persuasions-and they broadly condemned the doctrine. See Arty GEN'S
NAT'L CMM'N TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT (1955). Though both the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission had aggressively chal-
lenged some intra-firm conduct prior to that report, neither of them appears to
have brought any such challenge after 1955. See Robert A. Solo, Intra-Enterprise
383
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be different section 1 treatment of agreements among unincorpo-
rated divisions (which were categorically immune, even under the
intra-enterprise conspiracy rule) and incorporated subsidiaries
(which, because they could conspire under the rule, were open to
the many then-prevailing per se rules). This was so even though
there would frequently be no difference in substance between those
two ways of organizing a corporate family. Hence, there were fre-
quent complaints that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine ele-
vated form over substance. Critics also observed several reasons for
incorporating divisions separately that were not anticompetitive,
like managerial benefits, compliance with differing local regula-
tions, and a special tax benefit that existed prior to 1969.
But for all that, a fair question is whether the doctrine ever had
much of an effect as a practical matter. Most lower courts honored
it only in the breach, most often finding reasons in specific cases
why particular defendants had not violated section 1, even while
stating that theoretically they could have.30 The Supreme Court it-
self was fairly inconsistent during the thirty-year life of the doctrine,
deciding a handful of cases seemingly at odds with it.3' Genuinely
intraenterprise conspiracy was found in only a smattering of lower
court decisions.32
Anyway, this all came to an apparent end in 1984, when Cop-
perweld held that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are inca-
pable of conspiring.33 Though Copperweld was nominally limited to
Conspiracy and the Theory of the Firm, 34 J. Bus. 153, 155 (1961). Another strong and
frequently mentioned critique was in a 1965 address by Assistant Attorney General
Donald Turner, in which he argued that government enforcers should only bring
those cases they thought socially desirable, even if prevailing law might permit
more aggressive enforcement. He said that government "should not, for example,
attempt to push the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as far as a free-wheeling
interpretation of the Timken case might suggest." Donald F. Turner, Address Before
the American Bar Association, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 685, 687 (1965).
30. See Areeda, supra note 28, at 462-70.
31. See id. at 457-62.
32. Of course, corporate concern over the mere risk of liability might have
chilled the creation of otherwise desirable corporate groupings, or may have
caused undue caution in intra-firm communications or planning. But that seems
fairly unlikely. What proof is there that between 1951 and 1984 corporations were
shy about creating sprawling, complex corporate families, organized in any variety
of different ways?
33. Defendants were a manufacturer of structural steel tubing and its parent
corporation. The subsidiary was wholly owned by the parent and the two corpora-
tions shared the same headquarters and overlapping management. Plaintiff was a
rival manufacturer of steel tubing that was formed by a man who had served as an
officer of the defendant subsidiary before its acquisition. Plaintiff alleged that the
parent and subsidiary engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to thwart its entry
and survival in the structural steel tubing market. See generally Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 755-59 (1984).
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its facts,3 4 the Court pretty clearly signaled that relationships short
of outright ownership could constitute single entities, and implied
that the lower courts should formulate rules for when that could be.
The Court also made clear that the boundaries should follow eco-
nomic substance and not legal formalism. In the course of explain-
ing its new rule, the Court set out essentially three separate
economic ideas that would inevitably drive the contours of the sin-
gle-entity test it meant for the lower courts to fashion. First and
foremost, the Court stressed that separate firms have separate "in-
terests."3 5 While the Court never precisely explained which "inter-
ests" mattered or why, it apparently meant that separate firms do
not share in the same profits and losses. That seems reasonable,
because only firms "separate" in this sense stand to gain from un-
derselling one another. The Court implied that, other things
equal, antitrust should favor a greater number of "separate" firms
in a market, but should disregard the number of non-separate enti-
ties.36 Second, the Court implied the arguably different idea that
there is independent value in preserving some number of firms
under separate management teams.37 Finally, the Court offered
34. See id. at 767.
We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act. We do not consider under what circum-
stances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated
corporation it does not completely own.
Id.
35. Id. at 771 ("A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest.") The parent's and subsidiary's:
objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are
guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but
one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle
under the control of a single driver. With or without a formal 'agree-
ment,' the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole
shareholder.
Id. at 771-72 (parent and subsidiary "share a common purpose whether or not the
parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at
any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests.").
36. This is evidently the idea behind the Court's concern that only agreement
or combination of separate entities results in a "sudden joining" of competing re-
sources. See id. at 769 (parent and subsidiary are not "separate economic actors
pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly
bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals."); id.
at 771 ("If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do 'agree' to a course of action,
there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served differ-
ent interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.").
37. See id. at 769. Agreement among separate entities, unlike parent and
subsidiary:
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking
that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more
entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combin-
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the more homely policy point that a legal rule that discourages pro-
ductively efficient integrations would impose some costs.3 8 What
these ideas mean together is maybe a little vague, but fundamen-
tally the Court seemed to imply that most important is whether the
allegedly separate defendants internalize sufficiently adversarial
profit incentives that the law can require them to compete.
Copperweld has had a powerful sway with most observers, and
that seems to come at least in part from its simplicity. The particu-
lar decision before the Court in that case-whether a corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary could conspire-was admittedly a
simple one. And the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, whose vi-
ability was in question in the case, had been the focus of such volu-
minous, vehement, and largely unanimous criticism that only one
outcome seemed possible. And the reasoning of a court in a case
reaching such an obviously correct conclusion, it seems, must also
have the weight of exceptional common sense.
But as a matter of fact, Copperweld's very simplicity turns out to
be its major weakness. As Justice Marshall once said, easy cases
sometimes make bad law too.39 In Copperweld the problem was the
suggestion that courts should engage in a summary single-entity in-
quiry in every section 1 case, according only to the very abstract few
paragraphs of economic reasoning in the Copperweld opinion, and
that such an inquiry could be simple. Copperweld actually answered
only the narrowest conceivable question in this inherently difficult
area, and gave no consideration to the fact that in most cases ex-
cept that very narrow one, the issues would get much more com-
plex and uncertain.
ing to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the
diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly in-
creases the economic power moving in one particular direction.
Id.
38. The Court wrote that intra-enterprise conspiracy liability might "deprive
consumers of the efficiencies that decentralized management may bring," COp-
perweld, 467 U.S. at 771, and that "[c]oordination within a firm is as likely to result
from an effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition. In the market-
place, such coordination may be necessary if a business enterprise is to compete
effectively." Id. at 769.
39. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840 (1985) (Marshall,J., concurring)
("Easy cases at times produce bad law, for the rush to reach a clearly ordained
result, courts may offer up principles, doctrines, and statements that calmer reflec-
tion, and a fuller understanding of their implications in concrete settings, would
eschew.").
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II. WHY THERE USED TO NOT BE A THEORY, AND WHY...
WELL, ... THERE STILL KIND OF ISN'T
A. The Inherent Problem and the "Formalism" Irony
For practical purposes, non-trivial economic activity always in-
volves cooperation of biological persons of a sort that renders their
incentives different than under atomistic competition. Though it
may seem like some obviously real one, there is no obvious substan-
tive distinction between collaboration through consolidation or in-
ternal growth, on the one hand, and collaboration between
juridically distinct entities, on the other. In fact, that some particu-
lar collection of persons and assets are legally affiliated in a "corpo-
ration" is at best a convenient heuristic. Some trade associations
and standard setting bodies are incorporated, for example, and, Ap-
palachian Coals notwithstanding, 40 the law is clear that an otherwise
naked trade restraint cannot be made legal just by incorporating
it.4 1 Were the rule otherwise, any garden-variety cartel-even a
hard-core criminal conspiracy-could be immunized by a simple le-
gal fiction. Copperweld's heavy criticism of the old intra-enterprise
doctrine's "formalism" is therefore pretty obviously ironic. Cop-
perweld itself took as a fundamental premise that a distinction of
economic substance can be made to depend on a legal formalism.
There also remains surprisingly little guidance in economic
theory. The price theory that is our predominant model is notori-
ous for its failure to define the boundaries of firms at all,4 2 and the
one prominent body of modern theory concerned with the ques-
40. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). While
nominally still good law, Appalachian Coals is a highly anomalous decision, in which
the Court found a straightforward and quite naked price fixing cartel to be legal,
largely because the relevant industry was economically distressed in consequence
of the ongoing Great Depression. The conspiracy happened to have been incor-
porated as a jointly owned venture of several coal companies that were otherwise
horizontal competitors, and they appointed it their exclusive sales agent within a
specified territory. Appalachian Coals is now presumed a historical peculiarity with
no current force. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAw OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 196-99 (2000); William L. Reynolds &
Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. RE-v. 1811,
1812 (1995) (Appalachian Coals was an "extraordinary . . . decision" that "only
makes sense when placed in the context of the country's disillusionment with capi-
talism during the depths of the depression.").
41. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Likewise, the
early trade association cases-many of which were held to involve per se illegal
trade restraints-often involved associations that would have constituted state law
general partnerships. It is interesting that in none of these cases do the courts
appear to have considered whether entity status could be relevant to section 1
liability.
42. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a
Theory of Hierarchy, 6 BELL. J. ECON. 552, 552 (1975) ("Economic theory has had
387
HeinOnline  -- 18 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 387 2011
388 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
tion-the so-called "neo-institutionalist" or "transaction cost" eco-
nomics-generates at best complicated answers. In fact, its
argument is mainly to the effect that there is no real distinction at
all between "single" and "multiple" economic actors, or, that if
there is some distinction it is neither susceptible to rigorous theo-
retical definition nor is it especially important. In fact, such a the-
ory of the firm as there has come to be in either economics or law
is, more powerfully than anything, an argument that the bounda-
ries of the firm are a non-existent illusion.4 3
We could on the one hand try to dig more deeply through
Copperweld's many delphic generalizations, which is what the courts
and most commentators have done. On the other hand, we could
return to first principles and try to find that basis of distinction that
most justly serves the substantive purposes of antitrust law. But a
problem which seems not especially palatable to acknowledge is
simply this: however hard it may seem to believe, there may be no
principled distinction to be drawn on Copperweld's lines.
B. The Multiplicity of Post-Copperweld Tests and Their
Pre-Copperweld Antecedents
The analysis in the prior section is not just speculation. We
have seen plenty of attempted doctrinal formulations, both before
and after Copperweld, and they bear out the claim that single-entity
tests will never be theoretically robust or easy to administer.44 One
little to offer ... by way of explaining why particular firms choose particular con-
tractual arrangements.").
43. See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26J. L. & ECON.
1, 3 (1983) ("[W]e do not exactly know what the firm is-nor is it vital to know.
The word 'firm' is simply a shorthand description of a way to organize activities
under contractual arrangements that differ from those of ordinary product mar-
kets."); cf Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Theory of the Firm,
88 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PRoc. 66, 66, 70 (1998) (arguing that during the nine-
teenth century "no clear economic boundary distinguished ordinary contracts
from those considered by law to be firms," but nevertheless economic aspects of
"firmness" explaining the much greater interest of entrepreneurs of that time to
use the corporate form than the limited liability partnership form are evident).
44. One frequently made critique, which is probably applicable to all single-
entity tests, is that they will be complex in litigation. They will invite the delay,
complexity and expense of merits litigation which is their purpose to avoid. See
Chi. Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, concur-
ring); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REv.
751, 766 (1989); Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Sin-
gle-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L. J. 25, 46 (1991). This sup-
ports the point made in this paper: the very idea of the pre-trial single-entity
inquiry ought to just be disposed of because, however the test is formulated, it will
subject defendants to at least some of the same merits litigation that Copperweld
sought to spare them against.
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careful post-Copperweld opinion, Fraser v. Major League Soccer 4 5 writ-
ten by a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust-
predicted just this problem:
The law [on the single-entity question] could develop
along either or both of two different lines. One would ex-
pand upon Copperweld to develop functional tests or crite-
ria for shielding (or refusing to shield) such hybrids from
section 1 scrutiny for intra-enterprise arrangements. This
would be a complex task and add a new layer of analysis;
but where the analysis shielded the arrangement it would
serve to cut off similarly difficult, intrusive scrutiny of such
intra-enterprise activities under extremely generalized
rule of reason standards. It would also prevent claims,
clearly inappropriate in our view, under per se rules or
precedents dealing with arrangements between existing
independent competitors.
The other course is to reshape section I's rule of reason
toward a body of more flexible rules for interdependent
multi-party enterprises. Sports leagues are a primary ex-
ample but so are common franchising arrangements and
joint ventures that perform specific services for competi-
tors . . . Certainly the trend of section 1 law has been to
soften per se rules and to recognize the need for accommo-
dation among interdependent enterprises.
Once one goes beyond the classic single enterprise, in-
cluding Copperweld situations, it is difficult to find an easy
stopping point or even decide on the proper functional
criteria for hybrid cases. To the extent the criteria reflect
judgments that a particular practice in context is defensi-
ble, assessment under section 1 is more straightforward
and draws on developed law. Indeed, the best arguments
for upholding [the] restrictions [imposed by the defen-
dant before the court, Major League Soccer]-that it is a
new and risky venture, constrained in some (perhaps
great) measure by foreign and domestic competition for
players, that unquestionably creates a new enterprise with-
45. 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). Judge Kozinski also wrote a thoughtful cri-
tique of the post-Copperweldcaselaw in Freeman v. San Diego Bd. of Realtors, 322 F.
3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
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out combining existing competitors-have little to do with
its structure.4 6
The fundamental problem, Judge Boudin said, is that " [t] he crite-
ria suggested in the[ ] [single entity] cases are so general and so
various (unity of interest, lack of existing competition, extent of
control), as to emphasize the lack of any developed body of law."4 7
Unfortunately, the Fraser case was the exception. Almost all
other cases reaching the single-entity question have taken Cop-
perweld as a direction that they devise some test for answering it ulti-
mately informed by the economic reasoning laid out in the
Copperweld opinion. It is only too telling that the tests they've come
up with, such as they are, look almost exactly like the tests that had
been applied before Copperweld.
Prior to 1984, only the Third Circuit held that separate incor-
poration would always constitute plurality of defendants. 48 Other
courts to reach the issue largely settled on their so-called "single
entity" test, under which they examined a non-exclusive series of
qualitative factors that seemed likely indicators of economic unity.
These cases ordinarily did not set out explicit lists of relevant fac-
tors. They rather sifted through the record evidence, looking for
facts they consider to be either consistent or inconsistent with eco-
nomic unity.4 9 They were hardly unaware of the difficulty of their
problem; they admitted willingly that it was a "thicket."50
The Fifth Circuit arguably took a bit of a different stance. The
court observed that under Supreme Court caselaw a parent corpo-
ration, "[h]aving availed itself of separate incorporation for [its sub-
sidiary,] [had] marked it off as a distinct entity, and the antitrust
laws treat it as such." But the court also observed that this rule
46. Id. at 58-59.
47. Id. at 58 n.8.
48. Columbia Metal Culvert Co., Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579
F.2d 20, 33 n.49, 34 (3d Cir. 1978).
49. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir.
1979); Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 589-90 (8th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas
Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-19 (9th Cir. 1979). The Second Cir-
cuit never directly reached the issue, but indicated it would limit intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine on the basis of some factual consideration. See Triebwasser &
Katz v. AT&T, 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating in dicta that the
doctrine would not be "necessarily applicable" in case involving parent and its
"non-competing wholly owned subsidiary"); Int'l Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United
Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231, 240, 241 n.19 (2d Cir. 1976) (reserving the question
whether parent and wholly owned subsidiary could conspire).
50. See Int'1 Rys. of Cent. Am., 532 F.2d at 240, 241 n.19 (describing the ques-
tion as a "thicket," and citing authority critical of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine).
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would apply "especially when [affiliated corporate defendants] com-
pete," and made a specific point of observing that the corporate
defendants at issue had, by all appearances, actually competed with
one another.51
In a nice irony, Copperweld itself criticized these various "single
entity" approaches:
The factors simply describe the manner in which the par-
ent chooses to structure a subunit of itself. They cannot
overcome the basic fact that the ultimate interests of the
subsidiary and the parent are identical, so the parent and
the subsidiary must be viewed as a single economic unit.5 2
The Court did not foresee that as a consequence of its own
reasoning they would continue largely unabated.
The post-Copperweld cases are basically ad hoc; though they at-
tempt to explain their results with quotations from the economic
reasoning section of Copperweld, they mostly collect a few facts from
whatever record is before them and try to substantiate a gut-reac-
tion as to whether the defendants satisfy some nebulous abstraction
like"'shared interest" or "integration."
The thing that makes these post-Copperweld cases so hard is that
they lack precisely the thing that made Copperweld so easy. For ex-
ample, the courts consider it obvious that single entity status cannot
require a "complete unity of interest," even though that was the fact
that decided Copperweld.53 This cannot be the test, they say, because
even internal unincorporated divisions can have conflicts among
themselves and with their superiors. 5 4 But how much partial "unity
of interest" is enough "unity of interest?" Since there is no gui-
51. H&B Equip. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Harvester, 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir.
1978) (emphasis added). The court's discussion was ambiguous, though, so it
could either stand for a rule like that of the Third Circuit. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text for a possibly attenuated version of the single entity test.
52. Capperweld, 467 U.S. at 772 n.18.
53. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary
must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their gen-
eral corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate cor-
porate consciousnesses, but one.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Chi. Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding that such a rule "would be silly .... Conflicts are endemic in any
multi-stage firm, such as General Motors or IBM, . . . [but] these wrangles . . . do
not demonstrate that [such] firms are cartels, or subject to scrutiny under the Rule
of Reason [for] their decisions . . . .").
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dance, from either law or economics, it was inevitable that some
courts would find unity on the basis of roughly any common pur-
pose. The American Needle trial and appellate opinions demonstrate
this nicely. With virtually no analysis, and while insisting that as to
some conceivable activities the member teams of the NFL would
still be "separate," their shared interest in promoting a product
known as "NFL Football" rendered them incapable of conspiring
even in cases where they have fairly obvious pecuniary conflicts-
the licensing of their separately owned intellectual property.55
Even aside from its lack of theoretical rigor, this was a very bad
result. Substantial empirical evidence and a range of economic
opinion of preeminent pedigree suggest that the member teams
have virtually no shared pecuniary interest, as to most of their on-
field and off-field activity.56
Plenty of other examples can be found. The Eighth Circuit's
early and much noted decision in City of Mt. Pleasant v. Assoc. Elec.
Coop., Inc.5 7 found a state-wide group of separately organized,
loosely affiliated electricity cooperatives to constitute one single en-
tity. The court set out a fairly breathtaking test: "legally distinct en-
tities cannot conspire among themselves if they 'pursue[ ] the
common interests of the whole rather than interests separate from
those of the [group] itself.'"8 Similarly, a series of cases involving
"peer review" decisions by panels of doctors affiliated with a given
hospital found the peer review panels and the hospitals they serve
merely to be single units.5 9 In one emblematic opinion, this was
done only because doctors and hospitals at which they work share a
"unity of interest" just like that in Coppenveld, because "both of
[them] seek to upgrade the quality of patient care."6 0
Approaches like this are plainly problematic. Aside from the
fact that they seem contradictory to the many post-Copperweld Su-
preme Court decisions applying section 1 on the merits to closely
integrated joint ventures with strong shared interests,'6 1 and aside
55. See American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008); American
Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans, La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
56. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Economists in Support of Petitioner, American
Needle, Inc. v. NFL, No. 08-661 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2009).
57. 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
58. Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
59. See Oksanen v. Page Mem. Hosp., 954 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991); Nurse
Midwidery Ass'n v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990); Nanavati v. Burdette
Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 857 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1988).
60. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 703.
61. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
[Vol. 18: p. 377
HeinOnline  -- 18 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 392 2011
2011] Wiv COPPERWELD WAS ACTUALLY KIND OF DUMB
from the fact that they immunize coalitions that seems like they
probably could get up to some pretty serious funny business,62 they
offer nothing more than empirically unsupported and theoretically
unbounded hunches to confront the problems laid out by Judge
Boudin above. How much "integration" is enough?
And so this is all to say that, despite the sense that Copperweld
wisely resolved a mess resulting from Hugo Black's glib populism,
the case actually settled very little of anything. The same messy and
uncertain judicial inquiry is required now as was required before
1984, except that one narrow question of blackletter doctrine is off
the table.
III. CONCLUSION
In a way, the most emblematic event in post-Copperweld devel-
opments was the filing of an amicus brief in American Needle by
twenty economists, in support of plaintiff American Needle. In
about sixty pages of argument, they laid out an elaborate case, sup-
ported with extensive citation to theoretical and empirical evi-
dence, showing that not only are professional sports league
members notjust one unitary firm, their interests are actually wildly
adverse and the amount of cooperation that is actually needed
among them to make their product work is only a slender part of
what they do.63 That renders rather stark the fact that the lower
court opinions in American Needle comprised merely the thoughts of
four federal judges, with no especial economic expertise and mak-
ing their judgment with essentially no record, who wrote their total
of six or eight breezy, terse pages on the topic as if it were laughably
absurd to doubt the NFL's single-entity nature. Of course, there was
also a brief filed in American Needle by another bunch of very fancy
economists, citing another bunch of theory and evidence, and they
argued in support of the NFL.64
But that is precisely the point.
62. For example, in the hospital peer-review cases, the peer review panels are
comprised of doctors who all have privileges at the hospital, but may have outside
practices, treat their own patients within the hospital, and charge their own rates.
While it may very well be that in the ordinary case they are only concerned with the
quality of patient care, they also are a coalition of horizontal competitors with
power to determine whether other horizontal competitors will have access to a
useful competitive asset (the hospital).
63. See supra note 56.
64. See Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Amer-
ican Needle, Inc. v. NFL, No. 08-661 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2009).
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If this is an issue that bitterly divides one group of a dozen or
two prominent economists from another group of similar size and
prominence, should it really be an issue for summary, largely a pri-
ori resolution?
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